NOTES
DE FACTO SCHOOL SEGREGATION AND THE LAW:
FOCUS SAN DIEGO
I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education1 decision declared

segregated schools to be "inherently unequal," steadily mounting
numbers of American children have been attending increasingly
segregated schools.2 As a result, there has been a marked if gradual
shift in the focus of legal actions. Where primary concern had, for
a time, centered rather impersonally upon the spectacle of Southern
resistance and obstruction, by degrees the phenomenon of segregated
education has come to be recognized by many as a national dilemma
rather than a localized idiosyncracy. In Brown, invidious de jure
segregation was held to violate the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.3 Increasingly, the establishment or maintenance of "inherently unequal" schools has been challenged in the
courts as no less unconstitutional where these schools flourish within
the framework of so-called de facto, rather than de jure segregation.'
The purpose of this note will be to: (1) Provide background
1 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 "Over the past 15 years, Negro elementary school enrollment in most city school
systems has risen. There also has been an increase in the number of Negro elementary
students in majority-Negro and nearly all-Negro schools." U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 8 (1967) [hereinafter referred to
as U.S. COMMISSION REPORT].
In Cincinnati, Ohio, for example, the Negro elementary school enrollment
doubled over the last 15 years, but the number of Negro children in majorityNegro schools almost tripled ....
In Oakland, California, almost half of the
Negro elementary school children were in 90-100 percent Negro schools in
1965. Five years earlier, less than 10 percent were.
Id.
3 We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of "separate
but equal" has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.
Therefore, we hold that plaintiffs and others similarly situated . . . are, by
reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of
the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
347 U.S. at 495. In Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) de jure segregation
was also held to be a "denial of the due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment ......
4 In the following cases de facto segregation was recognized to create inequalities
warranting judicial remedy: Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967)?
Barksdale v. Springfield School Comm., 237 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass. 1965), vacated on
other grounds, 348 F.2d. 261 (1st Cir. 1965); Blocker v. Bd. of Educ., 226 F. Supp.
208 (E.D.N.Y. 1964); Branche v. Bd. of Educ., 204 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1962);
Jackson v. Pasadena City School Dist., 59 Cal. 2d 876, 382 P.2d 878, 31 Cal. Rptr.
606 (1963); Booker v. Bd. of Educ., 45 N.J. 161, 212 A.2d 1 (1965). For decisions
denying relief from de facto segregation, see cases cited note 8 infra.
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material on the causes and consequences of substantial racial imbalance in schools, together with an outline of some basic remedial
measures which may be available to alleviate this imbalance; (2)
review and evaluate the major theories underlying litigation involving de facto segregation; (3) discuss California law as it relates
to the compulsory elimination of de facto segregation; and (4)
analyze the possibilities for obtaining legal remedies to correct the
racial imbalance prevalent within the San Diego Unified School
DistrictY
II. BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES
OF RACIAL IMBALANCE

A. Definition
The term "de facto school segregation," as it is generally applied,
denotes a condition of substantial racial imbalance in the schools
which has come about adventitiously rather than by operation of
law." That such a definition is inadequate has been recognized by
numerous legal writers;7 the contention that it can also be seriously
misleading is fundamental to today's controversy regarding the
precise scope and limitations of the Brown decision and the authority
of the fourteenth amendment to compel state action to remedy "de
facto" school segregation.
It may be best to admit, from the start, that the terms "de jure"
and "de facto" represent elusive and frequently overlapping concepts. Many courts, unfortunately, have declined to acknowledge
this.8 Thus, while racial discrimination, as in Brown, has repeatedly
been held to constitute state action in derogation of the Constitution's equal protection clause," state-imposed compulsory attendance
5 See text accompanying notes 69 & 70 infra.

6 See Annot., 11 A.L.R.3d 782-83 (1967); U.S. COMMISSION REPORT at 219; 16

STAN. L. RV. 434, 435 n.6 (1964).
T See, e.g., Fiss, Racial Imbalance in Schools, 78 HAIv. L. REv. 564, 584 (1965);
Kaplan, Segregation Litigation and the Schools-Part I: The New Rochelle Experience,
58 Nw. U.L. REv. 1, 2 (1963).
8 See Deal v. Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 55, 62 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 88 S. Ct.
39 (1967); Bell v. School City of Gary, Indiana, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963); Webb
v. Bd. of Educ., 223 F. Supp. 466, 468 (D. Ill. 1963); Henry v. Godsell, 165 F. Supp.
87, 90 (D. Mich. 1958); Briggs v. Elliot, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
Explidt or implicit in all these decisions is the conviction that de jure and de facto
segregation are readily distinguishable; the first involves discrimination, which is
arbitrary and therefore proscribed, the second does not and is therefore constitutionally
permissible. See also text accompanying notes 44-50 infra.
o Goss v. Ed. of Educ., 373 US. 683 (1963); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958);
Borders v. Rippy, 247 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1957); Dowell v. School Ed., 219 F. Supp.
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zones which result in segregation have, unless purposely discriminatory, been generally exempt from this constitutional sanction on the
ground that the resultant segregation was merely adventitious or "de
facto."' While a detailed analysis of such court imposed distinctions
will be made in a later section of this note, the object here is primarily to illustrate some definitional problems.
It would appear, then, that whether a particular instance of racial
imbalance is classified as "de jure" or "de facto" is by no means
determined simply by the presence or absence of coercive state action.
More often, it is a function of the courts' relatively arbitrary determination that unless school segregation is the direct result of a
particular form of state action (i.e., invidious discrimination), it has
come about adventitiously-it is "de facto."" Because of such defects in the prevailing definition of de facto segregation, some writers
have abandoned the term altogether.12 Others have chosen to retain
it conditionally, making certain to inject appropriate qualifications
and warnings.' 3 For the purposes of this note, the term "de facto
segregation" will encompass the broad range of situations to which
it is normally applied. It will not, however, be defined as adventitious-for whether de facto segregation is adventitious remains one
of the principal issues to be determined. The working definition,
then, will be: a condition of substantial racial imbalance in schools,
which has resulted from any circumstance or combination of circumstances other than state-imposed racial discrimination.

B. Causes and Nature of De Facto
School Segregation
The phenomenon of racially segregated education, long familiar
in the southern and border states as the product of overt discriminatory legislation, 14 has, as a result of mass Negro migrations to the
427 (D. Okla. 1963), af/'d in part, 375 F.2d 158 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 387

U.S. 931 (1967).
10 See, e.g., Deal v. Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 88
S. Ct. 39 (1967); Bell v. School City of Gary, Indiana, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963).
11

Id.

12 In 78 HLnv. L. Rv. at 565, the legal implications of de facto segregation are

categorized in terms of the intent of school boards in creating segregated schools. These
categories: (1) active gerrymandering; (2) a policy of approval; and (3)

disregard are, in effect, substituted for the term de facto.

a policy of

13 E.g., CATER, De Facto School Segregation: An Examination of the Legal and
Constitutional Questions Presented, In DE FAcTo SEGREGATION AND CIVI RIGHTS
28, 29 (1965).
14 E.g., VA. CODE § 22-221 (1950) provided: "White and colored persons shall not
be taught in the same school, but shall be taught in separate schools .... "
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northern cities, gradually evolved into an established nationwide
system of separate and unequal schools.1 5 While precise causal

patterns may vary from district to district, the two fundamental
sources of this racial imbalance can be readily identified: (1) Purposely discriminatory school policies; and (2) neighborhood schools
in segregated minority areas.
Purposely discriminatory school policies, when challenged in the
courts, have generally been outlawed.16 These policies, notably
gerrymandering of school district boundaries and discriminatory
student transfer practices, are merely the reverse sides of the traditional segregationist coin. The objective is the same: racial separation; the method, however, is one of indirection and subterfuge. The
usual gerrymandering technique, which has been held to violate the
Constitution's equal protection clause, 17 is to manipulate compulsory

attendance zones in such a way that all or most Negro children find
themselves assigned to predominantly Negro schools, while white
children are zoned into white schools. In Goss v. Board of Education,"8 the practice of permitting white children to transfer from
majority-Negro to majority-white schools while denying such transfers to Negro pupils similarly located was also declared unconstitutional under the Brown mandate'?
However by far the most pervasive cause of substantial racial
15 See U.S. COMMISSION REPORT at 8-14.
16 See cases cited note 9 supra.

17 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17 (1958).

[T]he constitutional rights of children not to be discriminated against in
school admission on grounds of race or color declared by this Court in the
Brown case can neither be nullified openly and directly by State legislators
or State executive or judicial officers, nor nullified indirectly by them through
evasive schemes for segregation whether attempted "ingeniously or ingenously."
See also cases cited note 9 supra.
18 373 U.S. 683, 687.
19 Even within this limited context, however, the difficulty of obtaining clear and
convincing proof of discrimination may serve as an imposing obstacle to obtaining relief.
The extent to which this obstacle can be surmounted is very largely dependent on a
court's allocation of the burden of coming forward with the evidence. In Evans v.
Buchanan, 207 F. Supp. 820 (D. Del. 1962) for instance, it was held that a pre.
sumption of unconstitutionality arose from "the existence of an all Negro student body
and faculty, administered by a separate board and surrounded by white districts on all
sides...
Id. at 825. This, combined with the fact that "the evidence, in great part,
rest[ed] in the hands of those who conceived and implemented the plan" was sufficient
to place the burden of producing evidence of non-discriminatory motives upon the
defendant school boards. Id. The majority of courts, however, allocate to plaintiffs
the burden of producing evidence of discriminatory intent. See, e.g., Cragget v. Bd.
of Educ., 234 F. Supp. 381, 386 (D. Ohio 1964); Bell v. School City of Gary, Indiana,
213 F. Supp. 819, 826 (D. Ind. 1963); Henry v. Godsell, 165 F. Supp. 87, 92 (D.
Mich. 1958).
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imbalance in public education is the system of neighborhood schools
operating in segregated minority communities. It is this amalgam of
state imposed school districting and societally imposed residential
patterns which constitutes the core of de facto segregated education.
By their tendency to regard the neighborhood school system as fundamental and immutable, many courts have, in effect, exempted
states from their share of the responsibility for having established or
maintained segregated educational facilities. Referring to the effects
of neighborhood zoning, the opinion in Deal v. Cincinnati Board of
Education that "boards of education have no constitutional obligation
to relieve against racial imbalance which they did not cause or create
."20 typifies this line of reasoning.
Since no responsible court would seek to impose upon a state the
duty of eliminating, or even substantially altering an educational
policy which is not merely traditional, but for which there are no
reasonable alternatives, the initial question to be answered is a factual
one: Is the neighborhood school policy indispensable to a sound
public education? As will be seen later, the question is rarely posed
in these terms. Most courts are disinclined to interfere with administrative discretion further than to proscribe policies which are dearly
arbitrary or capricious, relating to no reasonable educational objective. 2' The following critical examination of the neighborhood
school concept, however, may well suggest answers, or at least approaches to a variety of judicial theories on de facto segregation,
regarding the constitutional implications of state action or inaction.
In general, the goals of the neighborhood school are: (1) To
provide a cheap, safe and fast means of transporting children between the home and school;22 (2) to keep schools small;2 3 (3) to
20 369 F.2d at 61 (emphasis added).
21 See text accompanying notes 44-50 infra for discussion of rational relationship
principle as it is applied to administrative actions which result in segregation.
22 BLACKMAN,

THE

NEIGHBORHOOD

SCHOOL

VaRsus

RACIAL

INTEGRATION:

A

REPORT To THE PLANNING PROFESSION 2-3 (a paper read at the American Institute
of Planners meeting March 21, 1964) [hereinafter cited as BLACKMAN REPORT] points
out, however, that: (1) "where educational goals can be achieved only by transportation
to distant schools, Americans have generally paid the cost, the time cost as well as the
money cost" (i.e., parochial or specialized schools, and centrally located schools in

rural areas); and (2) the assumption that greater walking distances, or major intersections to be crossed by a child increase the danger of accidents may not be correct.

"Is not a child safer crossing a major intersection with traffic controls than a minor
intersection without controls ?" Id.
23 BLACKMAN REPORT at 3-4.

[Sjchool size is not a function of location but of organization. If the ideal size
for an elementary school unit is 400 pupils... [with] a central location draw-

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW[

[Vol. 5

engender in children a sense of security by means of familiar surroundings and proximity to home; 24 and (4) to promote parental
25
support of schools.

While it has been ably argued that the neighborhood school is
by no means the only, or even necessarily the best vehicle for achieving the above-mentioned goals, 26 of greater consequence is the demon-

strable harm it can do.
Segregated schools, according to Brown, are inherently unequal;
needless to say it is the segregated minority schools which are inferior.
But segregated minority schools located in segregated minority neighborhoods impose a double handicap, for they subject their pupils to
the additional burden of trying to learn in what is usually an unpleasant and socially harmful environment. Thus, the inequality inherent
in any racially segregated school system tends, in this respect at least,
to be intensified rather than diminished by the neighborhood school.
More generally, the very characteristics of the neighborhood school
system which are most prized by the community at large are frequently those which work the greatest hardships upon low-income
27
and minority school children.
It is important, however, to distinguish between inequalities which
are inherent in all segregated educational experiences from those
which are merely the customary, though not inevitable incidents of
the ghetto or slum school. Since only the latter are even potentially
correctible without eliminating segregation, the distinction may be
crucial in determining whether administrative actions to remedy
fundamental inequalities have been made in good faith. If, in the
context of segregated education, only those inequities arising from
ing 2,000 pupils, there is no reason why we cannot build five separate buildings
at the one location or... even in one building, create five school units.

24 BL CKmAN REPORT at 4. However, "[tiwo recent studies have pointed out that

lower-class students feel quite insecure in school, indeed feel alienated in school even
though the school is close to home." For these children, a different environment may
be far more beneficial. Even for middle-class children, it is questionable that crippled,
private, rural or parochial school children "feel insecure simply because of the distant

location of their schools." Id.

25 BLAcKs AN REPORT at 5. Parental support and control of schools is a peculiarly
middle-class function from which the low-income child rarely benefits. Moreover, one
of the goals of such control by middle-class parents is to "keep [their childrens']
schools from being dominated by Negroes, by the children of the slums, by lower class
and deprived children of all sorts." Id.
26 See discussion notes 22-25 supra.
27 For example, children from low income homes are often deprived of a stable

classroom experience. Since their families tend to be very mobile, each time the
family moves, the child must change schools. BLACKfAN REPoRT at 6. See notes 24
& 25 supra.
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poverty are sought to be corrected, it is at least arguable that the
school authorities intend to maintain segregated schools. 28 In the
majority of states, absent statutory mandates requiring affirmative
action to remedy racial imbalance, 2 9 such an argument is unlikely to
be entertained, as it would have little relevance in jurisdictions
which impose no duty to alleviate segregated conditions. In California, however, it will be seen that evidence of good faith or the
lack of it may carry considerable weight ° The following distinctions, then, will be addressed to those jurisdictions in which, as in
California, they may have legal significance.
Of the inherently harmful consequences of segregated education,
perhaps the most pernicious is its tendency to further alienate minority children from the majority race and culture. This alienation, which
reinforces an already debilitating sense of inferiority, generally results in poor motivation and feelings of futility.3 1 The more impersonal deficiencies frequently associated with ghetto or slum schools
are: (1) Limited curriculum and services; (2) inferior physical

facilities; (3) overcrowding; (4) poor vocational guidance; (5)
high ratio of inexperienced and substitute teachers; (6) inadequate
community resources and support; and (7) unsafe and unhealthful
school sites. 2

It should be noted that the general inferiority of low-income or
28 See material cited on remedial measures undertaken by the Board of Education,

San Diego Unified School District, text accompanying notes 82-85, 115 infra.
29 But c. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 71, § 37D (Supp. 1966) which provides:
The school committee of each city, town and district shall, annually... submit
statistics sufficient to enable a determination to be made of the percent of nonwhite pupils in all public schools .... Whenever the state board of education
finds that racial imbalance exists in a public school it shall notify . . . the
school committee .

. .

. [The committee] shall thereupon prepare a plan to

eliminate such racial imbalance and file a copy of such plan with the board.
See U.S. CommissioN REPoRT at 232 n.95 for discussion of sanctions available under
Massachusetts law; text accompanying notes 57 & 58 infra. However, in Tometz v. Bd.
of Educ., 36 U.S.L.W. 2011, the Illinois Armstrong Act, which requires schools to
eliminate racial imbalance, was held to violate the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.
80 See text accompanying notes 101-03 infra.
31 U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDuc. AND WELFARE, OFFICE OF EDUC., EQUALITY OF
22 (July, 1966).
[A] pupil attitude factor, which appears to have a stronger relationship to
achievement than do all the 'schoo1' factors together, is the extent to which an
individual feels that he has some control over his own destiny ...
[M]inority pupils, except for Orientals, have far less conviction than whites
that they can affect their own environments and futures ....
[This attitude]
...
is related, for Negroes, to the proportion of whites in the schools. Those
Negroes in schools with a higher proportion of whites have a greater sense
of control.

EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY

32 See Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 421-42 (1967).
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"slum" schools is substantially the same whether they are majorityNegro or majority-white. 3 Much of this inequality can be partially
corrected by the simple expedient of distributing educational funds
equally among low, middle and high income schools of comparable
pupil enrollment. In addition, some school districts have sought to
counteract the harmful educational effects of poverty by channeling
additional funds, largely federal, into low-income schools.8 4 Thus,
with sufficient and wise expenditures of money, it would seem that
most, if not all of the educational deficiences of the low-income
school could be rectified. When dealing with the majority-Negro
school, however, the additional element of inherent inequality must
be taken into account-an inequality which by its nature can be
remedied in no other way than by eliminating segregated schools.
In order to compel reforms in the traditional system of neighborhood districting it is not enough, however, to decry its shortcomings,
or even to demonstrate that it is necessarily attended by serious educational inequities. Under any acceptable theory, an affirmative duty
to alter existing school policies must depend on the existence of
reasonably feasible alternatives to the neighborhood school plan. 85
That alternatives exist cannot be disputed; what must be determined
is whether they are feasible.
In evaluating the feasibility of alternative pupil assignment or site
selection plans, the primary administrative and judicial considerations have generally been pupil safety and convenience, utilization
of school space and cost. The practicability of any given remedial
device would naturally vary with the size, population, topography
and racial makeup of each community. Thus, the Princeton Plan, 80
for example, which requires enlargement of school zones to permit
38

"[W]hite areas with below average income receive just as bad educational service

as do Negro areas." BLACKMAN REPORT at 6.
34 See BOARD OF EDUCATION, Crry OF SAN DIEGO, REPORT OF CITIZENS COMMITTEE
ON EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES at 84-104 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
CITIZENS COMMITTEE REPORT].
35 Rejecting the suggestion of the district court that de facto segregation "must be

removed at all costs," the court of appeals in Barksdale, argued that "when the goal
is to equalize educational opportunity for all students, it would be no better to consider
the Negro's special interests exclusively than it would be to disregard them completely."
Barksdale v. Springfield School Comm., 348 1.2d 261, 264 (1st Cir. 1965).
36 U.S. COMMISSION REPORT at

142.

School pairing was introduced in 1948 in Princeton, N.J., a community which
had been served by two elementary schools, one nearly all white and the other
Negro. The school system merged the attendance areas of the two schools
and assigned all students in grades K-5 to one school and all students in the
remaining grades, grades 6-8, to the other. As a result of the pairing, each of
Princeton's elementary schools became majority-white.
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the pairing of adjacent majority-Negro and majority-white schools to
achieve recial balance, may be eminently suitable to some areas and
very nearly unworkable in others. Or, a pairing plan whereby all
pupils within a given area are assigned to previously imbalanced
school "A" for their first two or three years and then to school "B,"
might impose undue traffic hazards or walking distances upon elementary school pupils, but involve no such problems for junior or
senior high school students. For most large metropolitan school
districts, only a studiously tailored combination of corrective measures is likely to effect any substantial diminution of existing racial
imbalances.
In general, alternatives to the neighborhood plan fall naturally
into three major categories: (1) Voluntary pupil assignment (open
enrollment, permissive transfers, permissive bussing); (2) changes
in existing school zones (school pairing, altered elementary-juniorsenior high school feeder patterns, redrawing attendance boundaries); and (3) location of new schools (educational complexes,
educational parks, new schools in fringe areas) .17 Perhaps the most
promising and widely applicable of these plans is embodied in the
concept of the educational park. These parks, envisioned as the total
educational facilities of the future, would draw their student populations from the whole community and would group primary schools,
middle schools, high schools, and in some cases colleges, on a single
site with shared auditoriums, language labs, gymnasiums, health and
other services. Educational parks of varying sizes and types are
presently planned or under construction in Pittsburgh, New York,
Syracuse, Fort Lauderdale, East Orange, Berkeley, Evanston and
several other citiesY8 Ideally, such parks could provide not only
equal educational opportunities, but also furnish scope for innovations, permit greater individual attention to pupils and still operate
economically.
III. MAJOR JUDICIAL THEORIES INVOLVING
DE FACTO SEGREGATION

Relying heavily on the fact situation underlying the Brown decision, the majority of state and federal courts have apparently concluded that since Brown specifically proscribed pupil assignments
ST

38

See U.S. CoMMISSIoN REPORT at 140-83.

Educational Parks: What They Are and Why They Are, EDUCATION SUMMARY
5 (October 1, 1966); CrrizENs CoMIrE REPoRT at 42.
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based upon invidious racial classification, the holding contemplated
no wider prohibitions, and, in particular, exempted nondiscriminatory state action from constitutional purview.30 This view was persuasively challenged in Blocker v. Board of Education,40 where a New
York District Court held that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment does
not cease to operate once the narrow confines of the Brown-type
situation are exceeded ....

[C]an it be said," reasoned the court,

"that one type of segregation, having its basis in state law or evasive
schemes to defeat desegregation, is to be proscribed, while another,
having the same effect but another cause, is to be condoned? Surely,
the Constitution is made of sturdier stuff. ' 41 This reasoning is per-

haps best viewed as the logical extension of a more fundamental
argument-the argument that it is equality of opportunity which is
constitutionally protected. In reply to the contention that there is no
constitutional mandate to remedy racial imbalance, the court in
Barksdale v. Springfield School Committee pointed out that "that is
not the question. The question is whether there is a constitutional
duty to provide equal educationalopportunitiesfor all children within
the system."42 Having enunciated the central issue, the Barksdale
court concluded that where "the constitutional fact-the inadequacy
such a duty had, indeed, been
of segregated education" existed,
43
imposed by the Brown decision.
More often than not, courts which have denied plaintiffs relief
from de facto segregation have done so without actively disputing
the existence of this "constitutional fact." Rather, they have avoided
the constitutional implications of a failure to provide equal educational opportunities and have proceeded, instead, on the theory that
only discriminatory intent could impose upon the state a duty to act.
Thus, the largely unsupported view that the law does not require
"that a school system . . . honestly and conscientiously constructed
with no intention or purpose to segregate ... must be destroyed or
abandoned . . ."44 because it results in racial imbalance has been

adopted by a number of courts. 45 In the 1966 case of Deal v. Cincin89 See cases cited note 10 supra.
40 226 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1964).
41 Id. at 223.

42 237 F. Supp. 543, 546 (D. Mass. 1965) (emphasis added).
43 Id.
44 Bell v. School City of Gary, Indiana, 324 F.2d 209, 213 (7th Cir. 1963) (emphasis
added).
45 E.g., Downs v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.2d 988, 998 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 914 (1965).
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nati Board of Education,46 however, the same conclusion was reached

not by evading the issue of equal educational opportunity, but by
actually defining equality in terms of discriminatory state action.
The court held that "the element of inequality in Brown was the

unnecessary restriction on freedom of choice for the individual,
based on the... arbitrary factor of his race [a factor] ...unrelated

to legitimate governmental considerations." 4 The court reasoned
that the limitation inherent in a state imposed neighborhood school
plan does not share "the arbitrary, invidious characteristics of a
48
racially restrictive system."
While not directly responsive to the claim that inequality is to be
equated with arbitrary restrictions, the general view that rational
relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose is sufficient to
exempt state action from constitutional scrutiny, has been challenged both in and out of the courtroom. In a 1965 address on the
subject of de facto school segregation, United States District Court
Judge Skelly Wright, presaging his landmark decision in Hobson v.
Hansen,4 9 argued that:
[R] ational relationship is not the test of the legality of state action
where that action results in racial segregation ....[T]he officials
responsible therefor must show, not that their action was only
rationally related to a legitimate state purpose, but that there is no
way reasonably to accomplish that purpose absent racial segregation.50

In general, two central convictions have emerged from the cases
denying the existence of a constitutional duty to remedy de facto
school segregation. In addition to the belief that only intentional

segregation is constitutionally prohibited, courts have also contended
that school segregation resulting from a combination of neighborhood
districting and segregated housing patterns is adventitious.

1

The

resultant opinion, that imposition of the neighborhood school plan
does not constitute state action cognizable under the fourteenth
46

369 F.2d 55 (6th

Cir. 1966).

47 Id. at 60 (emphasis added).

Id. But see Fiss, supra note 7, at 591-95.
269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967).
0 Wright, Public School Desegregation:Legal Remedies for De Facto Segregation,
40 N.Y.U.L. RaV. 285, 296-97. The rationale for demanding that state action resulting
in segregation be justified by demonstrating necessity rather than mere absence of
arbitrariness or bias seems to rest upon the fundamental nature of the liberties sought
to be protected. See Blocker v. Bd. of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 208, 224-25 (E.D.N.Y.
1964).
51 See text accompanying note 20 supra.
48
49
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amendment, has been subject to two main lines of criticism. The primary argument is that compulsory, publicly financed education, which
results in substantial racial imbalance, constitutes segregation compelled by law and thus provides sufficient state action to bring it
within the rule of Brown.52 A second, more limited line of reasoning,
is based on possible state responsibility for the segregated housing
conditions, without which neighborhood districting alone would be
constitutionally innocuous.
For example [it is argued] where state policy with reference to
housing, or state encouragement of private racial covenants in housing, lead to residential segregation and the school board uses the
neighborhood plan in making pupil assignments, the school segregation that results is dearly the responsibility of the state. Certainly the
state will not be allowed to do in two steps what it may not do in
one.53

To date, the majority of courts have restricted the Brown
decision to its facts; they have denied or overlooked the state's role
in creating de facto segregated schools and have concluded that only
discriminatory state action could warrant judicial relief. 4 As the
harmful consequences of segregated schooling continue to manifest
themselves, perhaps the minority position will gain in stature. Perhaps it will be generally recognized that the Constitution is not, after
all, powerless to correct fundamental inequalities.

IV.

THE LAW IN CALIFORNIA

As one of the handful of states which has taken official notice of
the harmful effects of de facto segregation and reinforced this conviction by means of administrative action55 and judicial pronouncement," California appears to promise much to those seeking relief
from segregated educational practices. The full breadth and significance of that promise remain to be determined.
According to section 2010 of the California Administrative Code:
It is the dedared policy of the State Board of Education that persons
or agencies responsible for the establishment of school attendance
52

See Barksdale v. Springfield School Comm.

237

F. Supp. 543, 546 (D. Mass.

1965); Blocker v. Bd. of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 208, 227 (E.D.N.Y. 1964); Wright,

supra note 50, at 296.
53 Wright, supra note 50, at 295.
54 See cases cited note 10 supra.
55 5 CAL. ADM. CODE § 2010.
56 Jackson v. Pasadena City School Dist., 59 Cal. 2d 876, 382 P.2d 878, 31 Cal.

Rptr. 606 (1963).
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centers or the assignment of pupils thereto shall exert all effort to
avoid and eliminate segregation of children on account of race or
color. 57

This code section, adopted in 1963, is implemented and clarified
somewhat by the guidelines contained in accompanying section 2011,
which specify five considerations relating to ethnic or racial composition of schools which all school boards are to include among the
factors determining their establishment of school attendance areas
and practices.58 While the constitutionality of these regulations has
been confirmed by the Attorney General of California5 9 and their
soundness attested to by the state supreme court, 60 the scope and
methods of enforcement remain unclear. Unlike New York and
New Jersey, whose commissioners have authority to withhold state
funds for noncompliance with directives relating to equal educational
opportunities, 6 1 the California Codes contain no specific sanctions
to induce compliance. Rather, the State Board of Education has
57
58

5 CAL. ADr. CODE § 2010.

5 CAL. ADM.

CODE §

2011 provides:

ESTABLISHMENT OF SCHOOL ATrENDANCE AREAS AND SCHOOL ATTENDANCE
PRAcncEs IN SCHooL DIsvucrs. For the purpose of avoiding, insofar as

practicable, the establishment of attendance areas and attendance practices
which in practical effect discriminate upon an ethnic basis against pupils or
their families or which in practical effect tend to establish or maintain segregation on an ethnic basis, the governing board of a district in establishing attendance areas and attendance practices in the district shall include among the
factors considered the following:
(a) The ethnic composition of the residents in the immediate area of the
school.
(b) The ethnic composition of the residents in the territory peripheral to
the immediate area of the school.
(c) The effect on the ethnic composition of the student body of the school
based upon alternate plans for establishing the attendance area or attendance
practice.
(d) The effect on the ethnic composition of the student body of adjacent
schools based upon alternate plans for establishing an attendance area or an
attendance practice.
(e) The effect on the ethnic composition of the student body of the school
and of adjacent schools of the use of transportation presently necessary and
provided either by a parent or the district.
59 42 OPs. CAL. ATfY. GEN. 33 (1963).
60 Jackson v. Pasadena City School Dist., 59 Cal. 2d 876, 382 P.2d 878, 31 Cal. Rptr.

606 (1963).
61 See discussion inU.S. COMMSSION REPORT at 233.
62 5 CAL. ADM. CODE § 2001(c) lists
five factors affecting the ethnic composition
of an area to which the Department of Education will give special attention when
approving school sites.
5 CAL. ADM. CODE § 135.3 provides that:
County committees on school district organization in formulating plans and
recommendations for unified school districts
shall consider the following
standards:
(e) BOUNDARIES OF PROPOSED DSrRcrs. Each study report submitted in
support of a certificate of recommendation for district organization by a county
committee shall contain assurance that . . . (2)

in the judgment of the

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5

essentially confined its implementation of these code sections to an
advisory memorandum to District and County Superintendents, informing them that ". . . in California, school administrators and
school boards have not only the authority, but the legal duty to take
reasonable affirmative action to alleviate de facto segregation in
schools." The memorandum also offers the consultative services of
the Department of Education's Bureau of Intergroup Relations staff
to school districts requesting assistance in the development of desegregation plans. 3 A resolution of the Commission on Equal Opportunities in Education, revising the applicable Administrative Code
so as to require school districts with racially imbalanced schools to
"prepare plans to eliminate such imbalance"6' 4 was rejected by the
State Board of Education. 65
Despite the seeming dearth of practicable administrative remedies,
however, the prospects for judicial relief from segregated schooling
in California appear favorable. What remains uncertain is not so
much the potential availability of judicial redress as the conditions
under which such redress might be granted. In Jackson v.Pasadena
City School District,66 the California Supreme Court in 1963 dedared, by way of dictum:
[W]here [residential] segregation exists, it is not enough for a
school board to refrain from affirmative discriminatory conduct.
The harmful influence on the children will be reflected and intensified in the classroom if school attendance is determined on a geographic basis without corrective measures. The right to an equal
opportunity for education and the harmful consequences of segregacounty committee the proposed new district will not place obstacles in the way
of achieving racial integration in the schools.
Neither code section, however, contains sanctions.
63 Memorandum from Max Rafferty, Superintendent of Public Instruction, to
District and County Superintendents, School District Responsibility to Prevent Do
Facto Segregation at 3 (April 20, 1967).
64 Resolution adopted by the Commission on Equal Opportunities in Education at
2 (April 6, 1967) on revisions to 5 CAL. ADm. CODE, relating to State Board policy
and to school district and state responsibilities in preventing and eliminating racial and
ethnic imbalance.
05 At a November, 1967 meeting of the State Board of Education, both this resolution, and a similar recommendation presented by the State Committee on Public Education, were rejected by the board. Instead, the board agreed, by consensus, to propose legislation which would authorize them to require local school districts to prepare plans and
time-tables for integration of their students. Although the board is apparently determined
to seek legislative authorization before it will act, it is by no means settled, however,
that such additional grant of power is required. Telephone interview with Mr. Ted
Neff, Chief, Bureau of Intergroup Relations and Executive Secretary, Commission on
Equal Opportunities in Education, California State Department of Education, Nov.
16, 1967. See Los Angeles Times, Nov. 11, 1967, Part I at 20, col. 1-4.
66 59 Cal. 2d 876, 382 P.2d 878, 31 Cal. Rptr. 606 (1963).
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tion require that school boards take steps, insofar as reasonably
feasible, to alleviate racial imbalance in schools, regardless of its
cause.67
On the fundamental issue of duty, the court's dictum is clear-school
boards may be required to take steps to alleviate racial imbalance
even in the absence of discriminatory conduct. The importance of
resolving the remaining uncertainties, however, can hardly be overrated, for it is the construction and practical application of this
principle which is likely to signify the difference between a broad,
viable mandate for change and an arid pronouncement, powerless
to correct any but the most glaring inequities. The three central issues
which emerge from the Jackson dictum are: (1) What remedial
steps are to be characterized as reasonably feasible; (2) to what extent must racial imbalance be alleviated; and (3) what degree of
local administrative inaction will be deemed sufficient to justify judicial intervention?
V.

DE FACTO SEGREGATION IN SAN DIEGO

Since an abstract quest for solutions is likely to prove self-defeating, the remainder of this note will be devoted to an analysis of
California law as it may reasonably be applied to the de facto
segregation problems of one city-San Diego. Such an evaluation
may not be entirely academic, since prolonged dissatisfaction among
various individuals and civic groups with the alleged inaction of the
board has led one such group to file a class action against the board
8
in behalf of all adversely affected children.
As of October, 1965, approximately 10 per cent of the city-wide
population of San Diego was Negro.' 9 During 1965-66, 73.3 percent
of Negro children within the San Diego Unified School District
attended majority-Negro schools. Of these, approximately 14 percent attended schools where the racial composition was 90 to 100
percent Negro; at the same time, 88.7 percent of the white children
in the district were enrolled in schools which were 90 to 100 percent
white. 0 In brief, the majority of San Diego school children have been
attending substantially imbalanced schools.
Id. at 881, 382 P.2d at 881-82, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 609-10.
68 The Interorganizational Committee for School Integration, composed of representatives or members from about 30 civic and other organizations has retained attorneys
07

to file a class action against the San Diego Board of Education on behalf of all children

adversely affected by segregated schooling in San Diego.
609CITZENs COmmrrTEE REPORT at 13. Another 10 percent were Mexican-American.
70 U.S. COMMIssIoN RPORT at 4.
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Recognizing that racial imbalance "may be a deterrent to equal
educational opportunity," 71 the Board of Education of the San Diego
Unified School District in 1965 appointed a Citizens Committee on
Equal Educational Opportunities, charged with:
1. The responsibility for a full review of the opportunity available to children from racial or ethnic minorities, and;
2. The development of proposals for policies which should be
adopted or action which may be appropriately taken by the board to
reduce or eliminate any factors found which limit the educational
opportunities of these children. 72
On August 10, 1966, the Citizens Committee submitted to the Board
of Education a 136-page report, including 39 recommendations for
remedial action. 3 The report concluded that "a serious condition of
racial/ethnic imbalance" ' 4 exists in the San Diego school system,
that the trend "is to an increasing number of schools with minority
group imbalance" and that "the degree of minority concentration in
these schools is increasing .... ,, It was further determined that the
existing imbalance was "detrimental to the education of all children
76
in the schools."
In assessing the possible legal effect of the school board's response
to the committee recommendations and findings, it will be necessary,
first, to appreciate the dual character of the study and of the resultant
recommendations. Since the primary responsibility of the committee
was to formulate informed proposals aimed at securing equal educational opportunities for racial/ethnic minority children, the recommendations were almost necessarily of two kinds. First, those which
sought to improve the educational opportunities of minority children
within the context of segregated schools. Second, those aimed at
reducing or eliminating the segregation itself. In an apparent attempt
to forestall the anticipated response of the school board to these
71 Office of the Superintendent, San Diego City Schools, Equality of Opportunhy
at 3 (September 7, 1965).
72 Id. at 6.
78 The committee, chaired by Judge Byron Lindsley of the San Diego Superior
Court, was broadly representative of the community at large. Ten subcommittees were
appointed. The study was conducted by means of questionnaires, interviews, published
materials, statistical data and professional assistance from the District Administration,
and inspection of schools. Five open hearings were also conducted, at which 72 persons
testified. CITmENs ComrarE REPoRT at 5-7.
74 Id. at 134.
75 Id. at 17.
76 Id. at 19.
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proposals, the committee, in its summary of the report, reiterates its

position:
We contemplate an assault upon segregation and an assault upon
its effects. The recommendations to alleviate the deleterious consequences of segregation are not answers to the problem. They are an
indictment of it. If there were no imbalance of the nature we have
found to exist, many of these proposals would be unnecessary.
Therefore, we emphasize again the necessity for reduction and elimination of the basic causes.T7
In the 14 months since the Citizens Committee Report was presented, the San Diego Board of Education has acted upon 24 of the
39 committee recommendations.7 Of these 24 recommendations, the
majority have been accepted in principle;7 9 a few have been noticeably implemented,80 and only four have been openly rejected.8 1 In
Id. at 135.
78 The recommendations are listed in CrrzENs COMMIrEE REPORT at 115-29
[arabic numerals are substituted for original roman numerals: hereinafter the recommendations will be cited only to the appropriate numbers]. Recommendations acted
upon: 1, 4, 5(B), 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28,
32, 34, and 38. San Diego Bd. of Educ. Minutes, Oct. 11, 1966 to July 11, 1967. These
recommendations are reprinted in Compilation of Conclusions From the Superintendents
Equal Educational Opportunities Reports to the Board of Education, (Nos. 1-11)
77

[hereinafter cited as Compilations].
79 However, Recommendation 7, that "[n]o school be built nor attendance area
established which would violate California Administrative Code, Title V, Section
2011" was in part implemented, in part, apparently, ignored. The requirements of
subsection A of Recommendation 7, that "Bell Junior High School be built only if a
plan is devised which will not contribute to racial/ethnic imbalance at either O'Farrell
or Bell Junior High Schools" were met by modifying the boundaries of Bell Jr. High
School so as to maintain roughly the existing racial balance at both Bell and O'Farrell.
See Compilations at 1. The recommendation in subsection B that "radal/ethnic
balance should be a major factor in determining the location of. . . a new high school
to serve in the northeast section of the District" seems to have been disregarded. The
site selected for construction of the new Patrick Henry High School will result in an
essentially or totally white high school.
80 Recommendation 12, proposing an open enrollment plan, was adopted and
immediately implemented. During 1966 approximately 200 Negro children were enrolled in schools outside their neighborhoods. In 1967, about 490 minority children are
being privately transported to majority-white schools, at their families' expense. The
district has not provided transportation, thus effectively discriminating against children
whose families cannot afford to transport them. Recommendation 39 requested adequate
attention to aiding in the transportaion of open enrollment transferees. The statistics
above were obtained from the Office of Intergroup Education, San Diego City Schools.
For comment on open enrollment plans, see note 115 infra.
81 Recommendations 4, 5(B) and 6 were rejected as unfeasible. Compilations at 7;
Proposal to Pair Secondary Schools Termed Unfeasible, San Diego City Schools Staff
Bulletin Board, Feb. 14, 1967; San Diego not now deemed practical locale for Educational Parks; San Diego Union, Nov. 17, 1966, § B at 3. Recommendation 11, proposing that "[r]adal/ethnic balance be a major objective in designing the summer school

program . . .

,'"was

rejected more politely. School Superintendent Dailard's Equal

Educational Opportunities Report #10,

Compilations at 10, concludes that "the ob-
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order to evaluate the practical effect and consequent legal significance
of these board actions, however, it is essential to examine not merely
the number, but the nature of the proposals considered, adopted, implemented or rejected. To begin with, therefore, it should be noted
that only 9 of the 39 committee recommendations address themselves
to the formulation of specific, fundamental plans for alleviating racial
imbalance in the schools;82 seven proposals approach the problem of
imbalance in general or very limited terms,3 and the other 23 focus
on the secondary objective of upgrading segregated schools in such
areas as curriculum, textbooks, counseling, teacher training, class size
and facilities. 4 Having established this much, it will perhaps be
easier to view in realistic perspective the significance of the board's
response to the committee proposals. Of the primary nine recommendations, all but two have been either rejected or substantially
ignored."5
In this context, then, it should be profitable to return to an analysis
of the Jackson dictum and California Administrative Code sections
2010 and 2011 as they might be applied in a suit seeking to compel
the San Diego school board to take further affirmative action to
alleviate racial imbalance in the San Diego city schools.
Recommendations 5(B) s6 and 6,87 rejected by the school board as
unfeasible,88 proposed, respectively: (1) The reorganization of six
secondary schools to achieve a better racial balance;89 and (2) the
immediate promulgation of plans for development of educational
parksf0 Excessive cost was advanced as the reason for rejecting the
school reorganization plan;' the board's refusal to formulate even
jective sought by the committee can best be achieved by continuing and strengthening
the practices already established."
82 Recommendations 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, and 39. Of these, only 7(A) has been
meaningfully implemented. See note 79 supra. For disposition of Recommendation 12
see note 80 supra.
83 Recommendations 1, 2, 11, 13, 24, 29, and 30. Of these, only Recommendation 1,
calling for a policy statement, was fully implemented. Compilations at 12. Recommendations 13 (intergroup education) and 24 (integrated camp experiences) appear to
have been partially implemented. Compilations at 31 & 7.
84 E.g., Recommendation 25 (Textbooks used should depict minority groups in
undistorted or non-stereotyped roles); Recommendation 35 (Counseling service be
professionalized).
85 See note 82 supra.
86 CrrizENS CommrrrEn REPORT at 120.
87

Id. at 121.

88 See note 81 supra.
89 CrniZENS COMM=rrE REPoRT at 120.
90 Id. at 121.

o1 Proposalto Pair Secondary Schools Termed Unfeasible, San Diego City Schools
Staff Bulletin Board, Feb. 14, 1967.
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long-range plans for educational parks remains substantially unexplained.
There can-be little doubt that the mere introduction of evidence
attesting to the feasibility of the proposed school reorganization or
educational park plans would be held insufficient to warrant judicial
intervention. It is well established in California, as in most other
states, that courts "should let administrative boards and officers work
out their problems with as little judicial interference as possible....
Such boards are vested with a high discretion and its abuse must
appear very dearly before the courts will interfere."' 2 While it is
true, therefore, that judicial policy will almost certainly preclude
consideration of the feasibility of any particular plan as tending to
establish an abuse of discretion, evidence of the poor judgment
exercised and the cumulative harm arising from an aggregate of
questionable administrative decisions may be sufficient to impel court
action. Thus, while it is the general rule that courts will not "compel
a public administrative agency possessing discretionary power to act
in a particular manner [nor] . . . substitute its discretion for the

discretion properly vested in the administrative agency, 9' 3 it may
compel such agency to act. Although the Jackson language does not
prescribe ends to be attained, but rather imposes a conditional duty
to act, the obligation to take steps to alleviate racial imbalance is no
less judicially enforceable because it commands action rather than
dictating results. Moreover, the duty of devising remedies to combat
segregation need not be rendered nugatory merely because it is a
contingent rather than an absolute obligation.
Fundamentally, what must be demonstrated in San Diego is that
some reasonably feasible methods of alleviating segregation do appear to exist and that the school board has either purposely or
negligently failed to discover and/or to implement the available
methods-in short, that the school board has abused its discretion.
Since these appear to be the two necessary preconditions to the granting of judicial relief, a proper evaluation of each condition would
seem to require that they-be studied separately.
In evaluating the feasibility of a particular remedial measure, the
Jackson opinion first points out that "the practical necessities of
92 Maxwell v. Civil Service Comm'n, 169 Cal. 336, 339, 146 P. 869, 871 (1915).
93 Lindell Co. v. Bd. of Permit Appeals, 23 Cal. 2d 303, 315, 144 P.2d 4, 11
(1943) (emphasis added).
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governmental operation"9 4 cannot be overlooked. This much seems
inherent in the concept of feasibility. It is the next sentence, however,
which provides the sole, hazy guidelines by means of which administrators, courts or potential plaintiffs must seek to balance imponderable equities.
For example, [advises the court] consideration should be given,
on the one hand, to the degree of racial imbalance in the particular
school and the extent to which it affects the opportunity for education and, on the other hand, to such matters as the difficulty and
effectiveness of revising school boundaries so as to eliminate segregation and the availability of other facilities to which students can be
transferred.9 5
It is not unreasonable, perhaps, to suppose that such loosely drawn
criteria may encourage, or at least tempt, courts to exercise very
nearly unlimited discretion in weighing relevant factors, with the
result that lower court decisions may parallel closely the predelictions
and social theories of individual courts rather than reflecting a clearly
defined state policy. Possibly this was the intent of the California
Supreme Court.96 Such speculation aside, however, what is of consequence today is how the Supreme Court of California would deal
with the central dilemma of balancing degrees of racial imbalance
and consequent harm against the practical necessities of governmental operation. Whether the court's choice of words reflected a
fundamental uncertainty or simply signified its reluctance to establish
potentially rigid priorities is thus largely irrelevant. The clues, it
would seem, must lie not so much in the Jackson decision's "balancing" paragraph as in the fundamental intent of the court respecting
de facto school segregation and the manifest need for reforms. While
it would be presumptuous to attempt to gauge with any accuracy the
depth of commitment or sense of urgency with which the court views
the problem of segregated schools, it is difficult to believe that it
would permit the obligation it has imposed to be evaded by the mere
showing that an entrenched system of unequal education cannot be
remedied without effort, some difficulty and perhaps substantial cost.
The City of San Diego, despite extensive residential segregation,
is in a relatively favorable position to take effective steps to combat
segregation in its schools. That reasonably feasible remedies are
available is suggested by the following: (1) Unlike metropolitan
94 59 Cal. 2d at 882, 382 P.2d at 882, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 610.
95 Id.
96 See 51 CALIF. L. REV.810, 816 (1963).

1968] -

NOTES

areas with large, even overwhelming Negro concentrations, in San
Diego less than 12 percent of school children are Negro ;17 (2) as
administrators of a unified school district, the school board has
authority to effect reforms within a broad area without requiring the
consent or cooperation of outlying school districts;981 and (3) the
excellent San Diego freeway system would permit even long-distance
transportation of school children to be conducted efficiently and with
a minimum of hardship. By its rejection of some committee recommendations and continuing refusal to consider others, the school
board impliedly asserts that neither educational parks, pairing of
schools, bussing of students, nor the finding of a relatively central
location for its new high school, 9 are reasonably feasible. 0 0 This
assertion seems ill-founded.
Assuming the existence of feasible remedies which the San Diego
school board has declined or otherwise failed to adopt, it remains to
be established that such failure or refusal to act constitutes an abuse
of administrative discretion. Whether willful or negligent abuse is
alleged, judicial intervention may be invoked on several grounds.
Of these, charges of arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable administrative action are perhaps the most common.' 0 ' Should these allegations
appear unwarranted, plaintiffs may choose to allege plain disregard
of duty, breach of duty or action taken without due regard to the
97 For the 1966-67 school year, Negro pupils comprised 11 percent of the district's
K-12 school population. Board of Education, City of San Diego, Racial and Ethnic
Distribution of Enrollment-school year 1966-67, at 21 (Nov. 1, 1966).
98 See Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 515-16 (D.D.C. 1967) (which suggests
cooperation between city and suburban school districts). Since school districts with
predominantly or entirely white populations may be reluctant to cooperate in integration
plans, it is a decided advantage for a district to be capable of implementing its plans
independently.
99 See note 79 supra.
100 The school board has also maintained imbalance-causing optional attendance
zones which, if continued, might support an allegation of state imposed discrimination.
The effect, and often the purpose of optional zones in racially mixed areas, is to
permit white students living in predominantly Negro or "changing" areas to avoid
attending schools nearest their residences and to "escape" to majority-white or all-white
schools. The San Diego School Board has taken steps to eliminate a number of racially
innocuous optional zones but it is unclear whether those zones responsible for serious
racial imbalance will be meaningfully readjusted. See Compilations at 23-30. If, for
example, the optional zone between under-utilized Lincoln High School, which is
nearly all Negro, and overcrowded Crawford High School, which is predominantly
white, were eliminated without adjusting the boundaries so as to assign some white
Crawford students to Lincoln, the effect of eliminating the optional area between them
would be to freeze Negro and white students in their respective imbalanced schools. To
date, no such plans have been formulated by the school board.
101 2 Am. JuR. 2d Administrative Law § 650 (1962).
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rights of the petitioner. 10 2 While each of the above seems reasonably
applicable to claims of either willful or negligent abuse of discretion,
petitioners also have the option of asserting such exclusively intentional grounds as bad faith or improper motive or influence.103
Although the San Diego school board's actions or failures to act
may properly support any one or more of these charges, the following discussion will center largely upon those which appear most
readily demonstrable. For example, since courts traditionally allow
administrators great latitude in determining feasibility, 104 the contention that board action rejecting committee recommendations as
unfeasible was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable is certain to be
subjected to an unusually high standard of proof. Any indication that
the decisions resulted from the exercise of judgment, however faulty,
rather than mere whim, may be held a sufficient refutation of the
05
charge.
Less easily disposed of would be the allegation that board inaction
in failing even to consider 14 of the Committee recommendations
and offering no alternatives to proposals rejected as unfeasible, 0 0
constitutes a breach or disregard of duty and indicates a lack of due
regard for the rights of petitioners. A necessary concommitant to this
allegation is the fact that the complained of inaction has continued
despite a report by the San Diego Superintendent of Schools in
February, 1967, which conceded that "[t]he racial imbalance of the
San Diego city schools is continuing-the number of imbalanced
schools is increasing-and the degree of minority group concentra10 7
tion in certain schools is increasing."'
Finally, the motives of the school board and school superintendent
might well be questioned by alleging bad faith or improper motive
or influence. It should be understood, however, that such allegations
need not be predicated on a theory of personal racial bias-it would
be sufficient to demonstrate that either: (1) It is the intent of the
boardi for whatever reasons, to maintain a substantial degree of
102 2 CAL. JuR. Administrative Law § 182 (1952).
103 Id.
104 See 2 Af.JUR. 2d Administrative Law § 672 (1962).
1O5 United States v. New York Tel. Co., 326 U.S. 638, 655 (1945).
106 Recommendation 5(D) proposes that "Eajny alternative means which may be
devised for correcting these racial/ethnic imbalances at the secondary level should
achieve no less than the plans presented above." The school board has devised no

alternatives for the recommendations rejected.

107 San Diego City Schools Staff Bulletin Board, Feb. 6, 1967.
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school segregation; (2) it is the intent of the board not to take steps,
insofar as reasonably feasible, to alleviate racial imbalance; or (3) in
arriving at policy decisions regarding the alleviation of racial imbalance the board was influenced by improper considerations.
The first two allegations are identical to this extent, that where
inaction will necessarily perpetuate segregation, the intention not
to take feasible remedial action can, in effect, be regarded as an intent
to maintain segregation. The first, however, involves opposition to
integration itself, while the second may stem from lack of concern,
rigid commitment to neighborhood districting, bias against plans involving pupil transportation or fear of community disapproval if
necessary steps were taken. Whichever is alleged, the evidence adduced on behalf of either theory would probably include, in addition
to the instances of board action and inaction already mentioned:
(1) The board's failure to accept the proffered consultative services
of the Department of Education's Bureau of Intergroup Relations
Staff as an aid in developing desegregation plans;10 8 and (2) the
refusal of the board to seek apparently available state and federal
funds, 1 9 despite the claim of the San Diego School Superintendent
and his staff that certain remedial measures recommended by the
Citizen's Committee are unfeasible because of insufficient funds."1 0
An analysis of certain board established guidelines for evaluating
committee recommendations would seem to lend support to the third
allegation, charging that board decisions were influenced by improper
considerations.
Listed among these guidelines as considerations which might result
in a staff recommendation to implement a specific proposal were the
following:
(a) The extent to which the proposal will achieve its stated or
implied objective.
(b) The extent to which the condition being corrected is due to
weakness or malfunction in district policy.
108 See text accompanying note 63 supra.
109 Other California school districts which have employed federal funds available
under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act to promote integration
include Berkeley, Oakland, Riverside, Sacramento and Sausalito. Hearings on Guidelines
for School Desegregation, Before the Special Subcomm. on Civil Rights of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., Dec. 14, 15, 16, 1966. Naturally, such

funds, although available, must be requested by the school district.
.10 See note 91 supra.
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(c) The extent to which implementation places the school district in line with other districts facing the same problem.
(d) The extent to which it is judged that national and state
policy will be used to encourage implementation.
(e) The extent to which there is expectation of community
11
approval.
The implication inherent in guideline (b) appears to be that unless
district policies, rather than residential patterns, are the prime causes
of the undesirable situation sought to be corrected, the district may
have no responsibility to institute remedial measures. Such an interpretation of the duty imposed by California Administrative Code
Section 2010, as construed in Jackson, would run directly counter to
the plain language of the court, which directs school boards to "take
steps .. .to alleviate racial imbalance in schools regardless of its
112
cause."
Guideline (c) suggests that the San Diego School District may be
justified in maintaining a course of relative inaction, so long as other
school districts with similarly imbalanced schools continue to ignore
their manifest obligation to act. Were each district's duty to take
affirmative action thus conditioned upon compliance by other districts,
the obligation would dearly become meaningless.
Finally, the admonition in guideline (e) that otherwise desirable
action need not, perhaps, be taken in the absence of community
approval, represents an abdication by the board of its responsibility
of leadership in formulating school policies.
The school board's oblique disavowal of responsibility for the
alleviation of racial imbalance was further manifested in a May,
1967, policy statement reaffirming "its determination to use whatever
means are in keeping with sound educational policies to retard the
growth of racial/ethnic segregation and to use all reasonable means
to reduce racial/ethnic segregation in the schools of the district.""'
Having thus paraphrased the duty-defining words of the Jackson
dictum, the statement proceeds to so delimit the board's obligation
as to substantially preclude meaningful remedies and to vindicate a
policy of continued inaction. "Adoption of this position statement,"
declared the board, "does not establish any new programs nor does
111 San Diego City Schools, Guidelines For Citizens Study Groups, Nov. 22, 1966,
at 5.
112 59 Cal. 2d at 881, 382 P.2d at 882, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 610 (emphasis added).
313

San Diego City Schools, Report on Equal Educational Opportunities, May 16,

1967, at 3.
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it commit the district to any specific new course of action." 114 In light
of the board's failure to reduce, or even substantially retard the
growth of racial imbalance in the San Diego city schools, a declaration of intent to alleviate segregated conditions, accompanied by the
caution that no new course of action is to be inferred therefrom, may
in itself be sufficient grounds to support an allegation of bad faith.
In terms of California law, this much appears reasonably certain;
an abuse of discretion must be demonstrated. From this it would seem
to follow that neither faulty school board decisions, continuing widespread racial imbalance, nor any degree of administrative inaction
would be sufficient, in itself, to induce judicial intervention, absent
proof that the school board had abused its discretion. Each of these
factors may, however, serve as valuable evidence of such abuse. In
San Diego, where token integration measures are insufficient to mask
the school board's primary objective of combating the effects of
segregated schooling rather than school segregation itself, the evidence appears amply sufficient to warrant relief.115
114 Id. The statement also specifically rejects solutions which would require major
school program reorganization or "a massive redistribution of enrollment," and, finally,
intimates a broad disavowal of responsibility for the unilateral initiation of any meaningful remedial measures.
115 Despite official statements recognizing the harmful effects of school segregation,
an analysis of the San Diego school Board's response to the CnmzENs COMMITrE
REPORT can hardly fail to suggest that the board's fundamental approach to the task
of assuring equal educational opportunities to all children within the district is based
upon the belief that educational equality can be obtained without integrating the
schools. The board's commitment, in other words, is to compensatory education rather
than desegregation. Such a commitment is unacceptable on several grounds: (1) Contrary to the opinion in Brown, it implies that separate schools may, after all, be made
equal; (2) it is inherently unresponsive to the Jackson court's direction that, where
feasible, steps be taken to alleviate racial imbalance; and (3) independent of judicial
opinion, it appears to be educationally unsound. In a study of the comparative effects of
compensatory education (cultural enrichment, remedial reading, counseling) and
desegregation, based upon programs conducted in Syracuse, N.Y., Berkeley, Calif.,
Seattle, Wash., and Philadelphia, Pa., the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights concluded
that the educational achievement of Negro students receiving compensatory education
within segregated schools was inferior to that of similarly situated Negro students
attending majority-white schools which did not offer compensatory education. U.S.
COMMISSION REPORT at 128-40. The San Diego school board's policies and actions
reflect adherence to a number of convictions regarded as "misconceptions" in a report
adopted and implemented by the Massachusetts State Board of Education. See note 29
supra. Designated as "common misconceptions" were the following: (1) That inferior
educational achievement among Negro pupils results from poverty, rather than
segregation; (2) that compensatory education would be more helpful than integration;
and (3) that open enrollment is the answer to racial imbalance. The report characterizes
open enrollment plans (see note 80 supra) as, at best, placing the burden on parents
who may be unprepared to make choices, and "relieving school authorities of a responsibility which is properly theirs!' MASSACHUSETTS STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION,
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY

COMMITTEE ON RACIAL IMBALANCE AND EDUCATION at

3-5 (1965)(emphasis added).

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
VI. CONCLUSION

As de facto school segregation continues to grow, litigation seeking to compel remedial state action will undoubtedly continue to
increase. Although two contradictory lines of cases have evolved, the
majority of jurisdictions continue to deny relief, absent proof of discriminatory intent. The Supreme Court has remained silent.'
Whether the California Supreme Court based its opinion in Jackson on the Brown decision, the California Administrative Code or
simply state policy, l 7 its recognition of the duty to alleviate racial
imbalance in the schools offers hope that in California segregation
which can be reduced or eliminated will not be judicially tolerated.
If other state legislatures and courts remain unable or unwilling to
impose similar duties, perhaps it is time for the Supreme Court to
speak.
VERONICA
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116 E.g., Deal v. Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 88 S. Ct.
39 (1967); Downs v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 914 (1965); Dowell v. School Bd., 219 F. Supp. 427 (D. Okla. 1963), a/I'd.
in part, 375 F.2d 158 (10th Cir. 1967), cert, denied, 387 U.S. 931 (1967).
117 See 51 CALIF. L. Rv. at 812; 16 STAN. L. REv. 434, 435-36.

